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Abstract 
The rate of time preference (RTP) has been observed to be negatively correlated with 
incomes, but the mechanism behind this correlation is not yet sufficiently understood. 
Here, I examine it on the basis of fluid intelligence in an economy in which households 
behave according to the maximum degree of comfortability. I show that heterogeneity in 
fluid intelligences among households causes heterogeneous RTPs and incomes at the 
same time. This means that the negative correlation between RTP and incomes is spurious, 
and there is no direct causality between them. They only appear to be correlated because 
they are bridged by fluid intelligences.  
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
The rate of time preference (RTP) is regarded as negatively correlated with income, and 
many empirical studies have supported this correlation (e.g., Fisher, 1930; Lawrance, 
1991; Becker and Mulligan, 1997; Samwick, 1998; Frederick et al., 2002; Ventura, 2003). 
Even though the causality in this relationship is not necessarily clear, it is believed by 
many economists to exist (e.g., Fisher, 1930; Uzawa; 1968; Epstein and Hynes, 1983; 
Lucas and Stokey, 1984; Epstein, 1987; Obstfeld, 1990; Becker and Mulligan, 1997; 
Frederick et al., 2002), and many endogenous RTP models in which households’ RTPs 
are assumed to be formed on the basis of household current income have been constructed 
and used (e.g., Uzawa, 1968; Epstein and Hynes, 1983; Lucas and Stokey, 1984; Epstein, 
1987; Obstfeld, 1990). However, the mechanism behind this causality is not clearly 
demonstrated in these endogenous RTP models. In addition, these models have the 
inherent problem that they are unstable because of the assumption of this causality.  
 In this paper, I examine the mechanism behind the observed negative correlation 
between RTP and income from a different point of view on the basis of the concept of 
fluid intelligence in an economy under the maximum degree of comfortability (MDC)-
based procedure introduced by Harashima (2019). Fluid intelligence is one of several 
types of human intelligence, and it is usually defined as the ability to solve novel problems 
by thinking logically without depending only on previously acquired knowledge. The 
importance of fluid intelligence has been emphasized in psychology and psychometrics 
(e.g., Cattell, 1963, 1971), and it is usually modeled on the basis of item response theory 
(e.g., Lord and Novick, 1968; van der Linden and Hambleton, 1997). Harashima (2012) 
showed that, as fluid intelligence increases, the probability of solving unexpected 
problems increases and therefore productivity and labor incomes increase (Harashima, 
2009, 2016, 2017b). 
 Harashima (2018, 2019) presented a MDC-based procedure by which 
households reach a steady state. In most economic studies, it has been assumed that a 
household reaches a steady state by generating rational expectations on the basis of its 
RTP (i.e., the RTP-based procedure). However, rational expectations impose substantial 
demands on households in that they have to do something equivalent to computing 
complex large-scale non-linear dynamic macro-econometric models. Harashima (2018, 
2019) indicated that the capital-wage ratio (CWR) at MDC under the MDC-based 
procedure is equivalent to RTP under the RTP-based procedure. Furthermore, it is highly 
likely that households do not actually use the RTP-based procedure but instead use the 
MDC-based procedure, because the latter is far easier to use than the former but both 
equally lead households to the same steady state. The MDC-based procedure is very 
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simple—a household simply behaves on the basis of whether or not it feels most 
comfortable with its combination of labor income and capital (wealth).  
 In this paper, I show that heterogeneity in fluid intelligences among households 
causes heterogeneities in CWR at MDC and RTP as well as incomes. That is, the observed 
correlation between RTP and income is spurious and there is no direct causality between 
the two. They only appear to be correlated because they are bridged by fluid intelligence.  
 
2  FLUID INTELLIGENCE 
 
2.1  Model of fluid intelligence 
In psychology and psychometrics, many types of intelligence have been considered, 
including fluid intelligence, crystallized intelligence, short-term memory, long-term 
storage and retrieval, reading and writing ability, and visual processing. Among these, the 
importance of the difference between fluid intelligence and crystallized intelligence has 
been particularly emphasized. According to Cattell (1963, 1971), fluid intelligence is the 
ability to solve novel problems by thinking logically without depending only on 
knowledge previously acquired. This is the ability to deal with unexpected situations 
without relying only on knowledge obtained from schooling or previous experience. With 
the help of fluid intelligence, people can flexibly adapt their thinking to new problems or 
situations. By contrast, crystallized intelligence is the capacity to acquire and use 
knowledge or experience. This is the ability to communicate one’s knowledge and to 
reason by using previously learned experiences. 
  Fluid intelligence can be modeled on the basis of item response theory, which is 
widely used in psychometric studies (e.g., Lord and Novick, 1968; van der Linden and 
Hambleton, 1997). In particular, the item response function is used to describe the 
relationship between abilities and item responses (e.g., test scores or performances). A 
typical item response function is  
  𝑝(𝜂) = 𝑐 + 1 − 𝑐1 + exp[−𝑎(𝜂 − 𝑏)]  , 
 
where p is the probability of a correct response (e.g., answer) to an item (e.g., test or 
question), η (∞ > η > -∞) is a parameter that indicates an individual’s ability, a (> 0) is a 
parameter that characterizes the slope of the function, b (∞ ≥ b
 
≥ -∞) is a parameter that 
represents the difficulty of an item, and c (1 ≥ c
 
≥ 0) is a parameter that indicates the 
probability that an item can be answered correctly by chance.  
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2.2  Fluid intelligence, productivity, and labor income 
2.2.1  Productivity 
Harashima (2009, 2012, 2016, 2017b) showed that total factor productivity is positively 
correlated with the probability of ordinary (typical) workers’ solving unexpected 
problems in a unit of time, where “ordinary” means workers who are not highly educated 
and trained experts. In the process of production, many (although minor) unexpected 
problems occur, and fluid intelligence is indispensable to solve these unexpected 
problems. 
 On the basis of item response theory, the probability of a worker’s solving 
unexpected problems in a unit of time, ?̂?(𝐹𝐼), can be modeled as  
 ?̂?(𝐹𝐼) = 𝛿 + 1 − 𝛿1 + exp[−𝛾(𝐹𝐼 − ?̂?)]  ,                                   (1) 
 
where FI (∞ > FI > -∞) is a parameter that indicates an ordinary worker’s (household’s) 
fluid intelligence, 𝛾 (> 0) is a parameter that characterizes the slope of the function, ?̂? 
is a parameter that indicates the average difficulty of unexpected problems that the worker 
has to solve, and 𝛿 (1 ≥ 𝛿 ≥ 0) is the probability that unexpected problems are solved 
by chance. Harashima (2012) showed that productivity is positively correlated with ?̂?(𝐹𝐼); that is, fluid intelligence is positively correlated with productivity. Equation (1) 
indicates that the higher a worker’s fluid intelligence (i.e., a higher value of FI), the 
greater the probability of solving unexpected problems in a unit of time. 
 An ordinary worker’s ability to solve problems quickly with fluid intelligence 
affects productivity substantially. Fluid intelligence is therefore closely related to 
productivity, and furthermore, the causality runs from fluid intelligence to productivity. 
Equation (1) indicates that as a worker’s fluid intelligence increases, the worker’s 
productivity increases; that is,  
  𝑑𝑃𝑅𝑑𝐹𝐼 > 0 , 
 
where PR is an ordinary worker’s (household’s) productivity.  
 
2.2.2  Labor incomes 
Harashima (2009, 2012, 2016, 2017b) showed that labor incomes are positively 
proportionate to productivity, because a production function can be deduced from the 
basic natures of capital and labor inputs and the experience curve effect to be 
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 𝑌 = 𝜎𝜔𝐴𝜔𝐿𝐴𝛼𝐾1−𝛼𝐿𝛼 ,                                              (2) 
 
where Y is output, A is technology, K is capital input, L is labor input, α is a parameter (0 
< α < 1) that indicates labor share, 𝜎  (> 0) a parameter that represents a worker’s 
accessibility limit to capital with regard to location, and ωA and ωL are positive parameters. 
The value of 𝜎𝜔𝐴𝜔𝐿𝐴𝛼 indicates total factor productivity and 𝜔𝐴𝜔𝐿 is heterogeneous 
among workers, but 𝜎  and 𝐴𝛼  are common to all workers. Hence, a worker’s 
productivity can be represented by 𝜔𝐴𝜔𝐿 . In essence, workers can be interpreted as 
households, and therefore, worker productivity can be interpreted as household 
productivity. 
 By equation (2), the labor income of a worker (household) (w) is given by 
 𝑤 = (1 − 𝛼)𝜎𝜔𝐴𝜔𝐿𝐴𝛼𝑘1−𝛼 ,                                         (3) 
 
where 𝑘 = 𝐾𝐿 . Hence, the worker’s (household’s) labor income is a linear increasing 
function of 𝜔𝐴𝜔𝐿. Because productivity is caused by, and positively correlated with, FI 
(as shown in Section 2.2.1), a worker’s (household’s) labor income (w) is also caused by, 
and positively correlated with, its fluid intelligence. 
 
2.2.3  Approximation 
Ordinary workers are required to solve unexpected problems, but only minor ones. 
Solving difficult unexpected problems is basically delegated to highly educated and 
trained experts. Because unexpected problems with regard to 𝜔𝐴𝜔𝐿 that are delegated 
to ordinary workers are not difficult for most of these workers, the average difficulty (i.e., ?̂?) of the problems will be far smaller than most ordinary workers’ FIs. When ?̂? is 
sufficiently smaller than most ordinary workers’ FIs, the value of exp[−?̂?(𝐹𝐼 − ?̂?)] 
will be far smaller than unity, and therefore approximately 
  11 + exp[−?̂?(𝐹𝐼 − ?̂?)] ≅ 1 − exp[−?̂?(𝐹𝐼 − ?̂?)] . 
 
Hence, by equation (1), approximately,  
   ?̂?(𝐹𝐼) ≅ 𝛿 + (1 − 𝛿){1 − exp[−?̂?(𝐹𝐼 − ?̂?)]} .                             (4) 
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Taking this nature into consideration, the 𝜔𝐴𝜔𝐿  determined by ?̂?(𝐹𝐼) as shown in 
Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 can be approximately described as an exponentially decelerating 
increasing function of FI such that 
 𝜔𝐴𝜔𝐿 ≅ 𝛿̅{?̂? + (1 − 𝛿)[exp(−𝛾?̂?) − exp(−?̂?𝐹𝐼)]} 
 
by equation (4), where 𝛿̅ is a positive constant. Here, it is assumed for simplicity that 𝛿 = 0, and therefore  
 𝜔𝐴𝜔𝐿 ≅ 𝛿̅[exp(−𝛾?̂?) − exp(−?̂?𝐹𝐼)] .                                  (5) 
 
 Because the worker’s (household’s) labor income (w) is a linear increasing 
function of 𝜔𝐴𝜔𝐿 , as shown in Section 2.2.2, then it is also approximately an 
exponentially decelerating increasing function of FI such that  
 𝑤 ≅ 𝛿[exp(−?̂??̂?) − exp(−𝛾𝐹𝐼)]                                        (6) 
 
by equation (5), where 𝛿 is a positive constant. 
 This approximation means that, in a situation where unexpected problems with 
solutions that are (1) delegated to ordinary workers and (2) not difficult (i.e., ?̂? is far 
smaller than most workers’ FIs), an ordinary worker’s wage does not have the same 
relative increase even if the worker’s fluid intelligence is relatively high.  
 
3  MDC-BASED PROCEDURE 
 
The MDC-based procedure is explained briefly in this section. For a more detailed 
presentation, see Harashima (2018, 2019). 
 
3.1  “Comfortability” of the capital-wage ratio (CWR) 
Let kt and wt be per capita capital and wage (labor income), respectively, in period t. 
Under the MDC-based procedure, a household should first subjectively evaluate the value 
of ?̆?𝑡?̆?𝑡  where ?̆?𝑡 and ?̆?𝑡 are the kt and wt of the household, respectively. Let Γ be the 
household’s subjective valuation of ?̆?𝑡?̆?𝑡  and Γi be the value of ?̆?𝑡?̆?𝑡  of household i (i = 1, 
2, 3, … , M). The household should next assess whether it feels comfortable with its 
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current Γ, that is, its combination of income and capital. “Comfortable” in this context 
means at ease, not anxious, and other similar related feelings.  
 Let the “degree of comfortability” (DOC) represent how comfortable a 
household feels with its Γ. The higher the value of DOC, the more a household feels 
comfortable with its Γ. For each household, there will be a most comfortable capital-wage 
ratio (CWR) value, because the household will feel less comfortable if CWR is either too 
high or too low. That is, for each household, a maximum DOC exists. Let ?̃?  be a 
household’s state at which its DOC is the maximum (MDC), and let 𝛤(?̃?)  be a 
household’s Γ when it is at ?̃?. 𝛤(?̃?) therefore indicates the Γ that gives a household its 
MDC, and 𝛤(?̃?𝑖) is the Γi of household i at ?̃?𝑖. 
 
3.2  Homogeneous population 
Suppose first that all households are identical (i.e., a homogeneous population). 
 
3.2.1  Rules  
Household i should act according to the following rules:  
 
Rule 1-1: If household i feels that the current Γi is equal to 𝛤(?̃?𝑖), it maintains the same 
level of consumption for any i.  
Rule 1-2: If household i feels that the current Γi is not equal to 𝛤(?̃?𝑖), it adjusts its level 
of consumption until it feels that Γi is equal to 𝛤(?̃?𝑖) for any i. 
 
3.2.2  Steady state  
Households can reach a steady state even if they behave only according to Rules 1-1 and 
1-2. Let St be the state of the entire economy in period t, and 𝛤(𝑆𝑡) be the value of 𝑤𝑡𝑘𝑡  
of the entire economy at St (i.e., the economy’s average CWR). In addition, let ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶 be 
the steady state at which MDC is achieved and kept constant by all households, and 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶) be 𝛤(𝑆𝑡) for 𝑆𝑡 = ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶 . Let also ?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃 be the steady state under an RTP-
based procedure, that is, one derived in a Ramsey-type growth model in which households 
behave by discounting utilities by θ and generating rational expectations, where θ (> 0) 
is household RTP. In addition, let 𝛤(?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃) be 𝛤(𝑆𝑡) for 𝑆𝑡 = ?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃.  
 
Proposition 1: If households behave according to Rules 1-1 and 1-2, and if the value of 
θ calculated from the values of variables at ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶 is used as the value of θ under the RTP-
based procedure in an economy where θ is identical for all households, then 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶) =𝛤(?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃).     
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Proof: See Harashima (2018, 2019).  
 
Proposition 1 indicates that we can interpret that ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶 is equivalent to ?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃. This means 
that both procedures can function equivalently and that CWR at MDC is substitutable for 
RTP as a guide for household behavior.  
 
3.3  Heterogeneous population 
In actuality, however, households are not identical—they are heterogeneous—and, if 
heterogeneous households behave unilaterally, there is no guarantee that a steady state 
other than corner solutions exists (Becker, 1980; Harashima, 2010, 2017a). However, 
Harashima (2010, 2017a) showed that a sustainable heterogeneity (SH) at which all 
optimality conditions of all heterogeneous households are simultaneously satisfied exists 
under the RTP-based procedure. In addition, Harashima (2018, 2019) showed that SH 
also exists under the MDC-based procedure, although Rules 1-1 and 1-2 have to be 
revised and a rule for the government must be added in a heterogeneous population.     
 Suppose that households are identical except for their CWRs at MDC (i.e., their 
values of 𝛤(?̃?)). Let ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻 be the steady state at which MDC is achieved and kept 
constant by any household (i.e., SH in a heterogeneous population under the MDC-based 
procedure), and let 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻) be 𝛤(𝑆𝑡) for 𝑆𝑡 = ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻 . In addition, let ΓR be a 
household’s numerically adjusted value of Γ for SH based on its estimated value of 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻) and several other related values. Specifically, let ΓR,i be the ΓR of household 
i. Also let T be the net transfer that households receive from the government with regard 
to SH and Ti be the net transfer that household i receives (i = 1,2,3, … , M). 
 
3.3.1  Revised and additional rules 
Household i should act according to the following rules in a heterogeneous population:  
 
Rule 2-1: If household i feels that the current ΓR,i is equal to 𝛤(?̃?𝑖), it maintains the same 
level of consumption as before for any i. 
Rule 2-2: If household i feels that the current ΓR,i is not equal to 𝛤(?̃?𝑖), it adjusts its level 
of consumption or revises its estimated value of 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻) so that it perceives that ΓR,i 
is equal to 𝛤(?̃?𝑖) for any i.  
 
At the same time, the government must act according to the following rule:  
 
Rule 3: The government adjusts Ti for some i if necessary to make the number of votes 
cast in elections in response to increases in the level of economic inequality equivalent to 
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the number cast in response to decreases. 
 
3.3.2  Steady state  
Even if households and the government behave according to Rules 2-1, 2-2, and 3, there 
is no guarantee that the economy can reach ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻 . However, thanks to the 
government’s intervention, SH can be approximately achieved. Let ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝 be the 
state at which ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻  is approximately achieved, and 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝)  be 𝛤(𝑆𝑡)  at ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝 on average. Here, let ?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃,𝑆𝐻 be the steady state that satisfies SH under the 
RTP-based procedure. In addition, let 𝛤(?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃,𝑆𝐻) be 𝛤(𝑆𝑡) for 𝑆𝑡 = ?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃,𝑆𝐻. 
 
Proposition 2: If households are identical except for their values of 𝛤(?̃?) and behave 
unilaterally according to Rules 2-1 and 2-2, if the government behaves according to Rule 
3, and if the value of θi that is calculated back from the values of variables at ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝 
is used as the value of θi for any i under the RTP-based procedure in an economy where 
households are identical except for their θs, then 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝) = 𝛤(?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃,𝑆𝐻).  
Proof: See Harashima (2018, 2019).  
 
Proposition 2 indicates that we can interpret that ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝 is equivalent to ?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃,𝑆𝐻 
and that CWR at MDC is substitutable for RTP as a guide for heterogeneous households’ 
behavior. Furthermore, no matter what values of T, ΓR, and 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻) are severally 
estimated by households, any ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝 can be interpreted as the objectively correct 
and true steady state. In addition, a government need not necessarily provide the 
objectively correct Ti for ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝  even though ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝  is interpreted as 
objectively correct and true.  
 
4  CWR AT MDC AND FLUID INTELLIGENCE 
 
4.1  The degree of freedom of choice 
4.1.1  Fluid intelligence and economic activities 
As discussed in Section 2.2 and shown by Harashima (2009, 2012, 2016, 2017b), total 
factor productivity depends not only on the level of technology (A) but also on ordinary 
workers’ abilities to solve a large number of unexpected minor problems (𝜔𝐴𝜔𝐿), and the 
workers’ fluid intelligence is indispensable to solving these unexpected problems 
(Harashima, 2012).  
 Nevertheless, fluid intelligence is indispensable not only after unexpected 
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problems occur but also before they occur. The future is uncertain, and people understand 
that there are always risks of unexpected problems in the future. However, if the future 
can be more precisely foreseen, the probability of occurrence of these kinds of problems 
can be reduced, so that some of the problems can be anticipated or solved before they 
occur. As more previously unexpected problems are anticipated, higher levels of 
consumption can be enjoyed. Hence, reducing the number of unexpected problems ex 
ante is as important as solving them ex post.  
 Both solving and preventing or avoiding unexpected problems require fluid 
intelligence, and fluid intelligence is indispensable to fix unexpected problems, as 
discussed in Section 2 and by Harashima (2012). Both solving and reducing the number 
of unexpected problems are achieved in the same manner—by newly uncovering the 
mechanism by which a hitherto unknown problem occurs and innovating a way to fix or 
avert it. 
 Humans are endowed with reason and therefore can foresee the future and plan 
for their future actions. As Harashima (2018, 2019) indicates, even under the MDC-based 
procedure, households behave fully considering the future and choose the best plan for 
their futures. Hence, households make an effort to foresee the future to the extent possible 
even under the MDC-based procedure. Of course, foreseeing the future includes activities 
related to reducing the number of unexpected problems to the greatest degree possible 
before they occur.  
 What should a household foresee when making a future plan with regard to 
MDC? Households need to clarify choices between consumption and saving, because 
MDC indicates how much a household prefers to save out of its labor income. In a future 
plan for consumption and saving, goods and services that are to be consumed in the future 
should be clearly distinguished from those consumed at present. Hence, the plan should 
be made fully considering what kinds of goods and services can be consumed and how 
they can be consumed in the future while at the same time preventing or avoiding 
unexpected problems as much as possible with fluid intelligence. Because CWR means 
the combination of consumption and saving, therefore a household’s CWR at MDC 
reflects its future plan for consumption and saving. 
 
4.1.2  Consumption opportunities 
Let a “consumption opportunity” be a technologically and physically feasible opportunity 
of consuming a good or service in a future period for a household. Opportunities of 
consuming different goods and services in the same future period are counted as different 
consumption opportunities. Nevertheless, a household cannot simultaneously realize 
more than one consumption opportunity from among many consumption opportunities. 
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This means that each household has a large number of consumption opportunities in each 
period, but it can realize only a fraction of them in that period. Therefore, when a 
household makes its future plan, it has to carefully examine which consumption 
opportunities should be realized from among the many competing consumption 
opportunities.  
Some of the consumption opportunities may be technologically or physically 
feasible, but they still may not be accessible to all households. It is highly likely that the 
number of consumption opportunities that each household can actually realize is 
heterogeneous among households, because the scopes of accessible consumption 
opportunities from which the households choose are highly likely to be heterogeneous 
among households. 
 When a household makes its future plan for consumption and saving, it should 
first ascertain which consumption opportunities it can access. Households will sort 
consumption opportunities into “accessible consumption opportunities” that are thought 
to be accessible and “inaccessible consumption opportunities” that are not. Different 
households sort consumption opportunities differently because households are by nature 
heterogeneous.  
 Various factors will influence household sorting choices. For example, 
affordability will matter because consumption requires money or other exchangeable 
resources. If the opportunity for consumption of an expensive good or service is not 
affordable because of a budget constraint, it will be thought of as inaccessible. As 
compared with necessities, luxuries will be thought to be inaccessible far more often than 
necessities. Another factor is qualification or privilege, because some consumption 
opportunities require a household to possess some type of qualification—for example, a 
high score on an entrance exam for an exclusive school. Even if a household can afford 
this consumption opportunity, it cannot access it if it does not possess the required 
qualification. 
 However, the most important factor is probably uncertainty. The future is 
uncertain because humans are imperfect, and unexpected problems inevitably will occur. 
The affordability and qualification factors themselves are not certain. If a household is 
uncertain whether some consumption opportunities are affordable because its budget 
constraint is uncertain, it may sort these opportunities as inaccessible. When a household 
makes a future plan for its consumption and saving, therefore, its perception of 
uncertainty about its future will be very important. If a household estimates that its future 
is more uncertain, it will give up a larger amount of consumption opportunities and sort 
them as inaccessible. Conversely, it may sort more opportunities as accessible if it 
perceives a more certain future. A household’s amount of accessible consumption 
opportunities will therefore depend significantly on its perceived uncertainty about the 
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future.  
 It will not matter to a household nevertheless even if it can access only a handful 
of consumption opportunities, because consumption opportunities include both 
necessities and luxury items. In the industrialized economies, most of the consumption 
opportunities could be considered to be luxuries in a broad sense, and consumption 
opportunities corresponding to civil minimums will make up a relatively small fraction 
of all consumption opportunities. Hence, a household will generally be able to access 
many consumption opportunities of necessities.  
 
4.1.3  Timing of consumption  
Households obtain utilities by consuming goods and services, but even if the same good 
or service is consumed, the level of utility obtained by each household will differ, 
depending on the timing of consumption. A household may strongly desire to consume a 
good or service in a specific favorable period but may never want it in other periods. If a 
household cannot avoid consuming a good or service in a less desirable or even unwanted 
consumption period, the utility it obtains will be far less than that if it can consume it in 
the desired period. For example, in summer, people do not want to consume a good or 
service that is useful only in winter. Similarly, when people are old, they do not want to 
consume a good or service that is useful only for young people. In addition, people may 
become tired of consuming a good or service if the amount is excessive, and they may 
want to consume only part of it in the current period.  
 The most desirable period or best timing of consumption will vary across goods 
and services as well as households. The best timing may occur only once, or it may be 
repeated at some interval. In any case, it may not always be easy for a household to 
consume a good or service exactly at the best or most desired timing. In general, a 
household can realize the consumption of daily necessaries at the best consumption 
timings, but it may not necessarily be easy to realize the consumption of some goods and 
services that are consumed much more infrequently at the best timing.  
 If a household cannot realize consumption opportunities that match the desired 
timings, its utilities are lower than if it can. Hence, households also have to estimate 
whether they can realize the consumption opportunities that match the best consumption 
timings in future plans for consumption and saving. If a household can clearly foresee 
that a consumption opportunity does not match the best timing, it will most likely exclude 
this consumption opportunity from consideration. In general, the less certain a household 
is about whether a consumption opportunity matches the best timing, the more likely it 
will be to exclude the opportunity from consideration. The reluctance to give up 
consumption opportunities because of uncertainty about the best timings will be far lower 
in the case of luxuries than necessities. Because most consumption opportunities are for 
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luxuries, as discussed in Section 4.1.2, a household will generally not pursue an accessible 
consumption opportunity if it is uncertain whether this opportunity matches the best 
timing.  
 
4.1.4  The degree of freedom of choice   
4.1.4.1  Consumption accessibility 
Suppose for simplicity that each household has N consumption opportunities. A 
household can access only a small portion of the opportunities because of the constraints 
discussed in Section 4.1.2. Therefore, in making its future plan for consumption and 
saving, it determines which consumption opportunities it can access. Here, household i 
estimates that it can access ni (≤ N) out of N consumption opportunities. Let the ratio  
 𝑛𝑖𝑁 = 𝜇𝑖                                                            (7) 
 
be the “consumption accessibility” of household i, and evidently, 
  𝑑𝑛𝑖𝑑𝜇𝑖 = N = const.                                                     (8) 
 
4.1.4.2  Consumption accuracy 
Suppose that, for any household, the best consumption timing of any good or service 
arrives within a finite period, and even if the best consumption timings are multiple and 
arrive repeatedly, each of the repeated best timings arrives in a finite period after the last 
one. Let a “best timing consumption opportunity” be a consumption opportunity that 
matches the best consumption timing. Household i estimates that it can realize mi best 
timing consumption opportunities out of ni accessible consumption opportunities. Let the 
ratio  
 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖 = 𝜋𝑖                                                           (9) 
 
be the “consumption accuracy” of household i, and evidently, 
 𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑑𝜋𝑖 = 𝑛𝑖 = const. 
 
4.1.4.3  Degree of freedom of choice in consumption 
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By the nature of consumption accessibility and accuracy,  
 𝐹𝑖 = 𝜇𝑖𝜋𝑖= 𝑚𝑖𝑁                                                     (10) 
 
indicates how much household i has freedom of choice in consumption in the future. If Fi 
is higher, household i can choose a consumption opportunity in a future period from 
among a larger amount of best timing consumption opportunities. Let Fi be the “degree 
of freedom of choice” (DFC). 
 By the natures of μi and πi, for any i,  
 𝜕𝐹𝑖𝜕𝜇𝑖 > 0                                                          (11) 
 
and  
 𝜕𝐹𝑖𝜕𝜋𝑖 > 0 .                                                       (12) 
 
4.2  The DFC model   
4.2.1  Fluid intelligence and DFC 
4.2.1.1  Fluid intelligence and accessible consumption opportunities 
As discussed in Section 4.1.2, uncertainties about the future are significantly important in 
a household’s determination of the accessibility of its consumption opportunities. In 
addition, as discussed in Section 4.1.1, fluid intelligence is indispensable to reducing 
uncertainties about consumption opportunities. Hence, the number of accessible 
consumption opportunities is substantially influenced by fluid intelligence. Taking this 
nature into consideration, it is highly likely that if a household possesses a higher fluid 
intelligence it can access a larger number of consumption opportunities than households 
with lower fluid intelligences. That is,  
 𝑑𝜇𝑖𝑑𝐹𝐼𝑖 > 0 ,                                                       (13) 
 
where FIi is the degree of fluid intelligence of household i. 
 Note that affordability, which is a factor in accessibility, directly depends on 
labor incomes, and labor incomes (as well as productivity) depend on fluid intelligence, 
as indicated in Section 2.2. Hence, the number of accessible consumption opportunities 
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is also influenced by fluid intelligence directly through this channel. In addition, in 
modern societies, many qualifications, which are also a source of accessibility (as 
discussed in Section 4.1.2), are based on abilities in specific fields, because a 
“qualification” in this sense basically means some kind of superiority over other people. 
Because fluid intelligence is one of the most important sources of human intellectual 
abilities, fluid intelligence will also substantially affect the amount of accessible 
consumption opportunities through this channel.  
 
4.2.1.2  Fluid intelligence and best timing of consumption 
As discussed in Section 4.1.1, fluid intelligence is indispensable to reducing uncertainty 
as a whole, and therefore it is also reduces uncertainty about best consumption timings. 
If a household possesses a higher fluid intelligence, it can probably realize best timing 
consumption opportunities than households with lower fluid intelligences. That is, 
 𝑑𝜋𝑖𝑑𝐹𝐼𝑖 > 0 .                                                       (14) 
 
4.2.1.3  Fluid intelligence and DFC 
By the total derivative of Fi, for any i,   
 𝑑𝐹𝑖𝑑𝐹𝐼𝑖 = 𝜕𝐹𝑖𝜕𝜇𝑖 𝑑𝜇𝑖𝑑𝐹𝐼𝑖 + 𝜕𝐹𝑖𝜕𝜋𝑖 𝑑𝜋𝑖𝑑𝐹𝐼𝑖                                          (15) 
 
By inequalities (11), (12), (13), and (14) and equation (15), 
 𝑑𝐹𝑖𝑑𝐹𝐼𝑖 > 0 .                                                       (16) 
 
That is, DFC (Fi) is a function of fluid intelligence FIi, and as FIi increases, Fi increases. 
 
4.2.2  The DFC model 
Because DFC (F) is a function of fluid intelligence (FI), item response theory can be used 
to construct a model of DFC. That is, Fi can be modeled on the basis of equation (1) such 
that 
 𝐹𝑖 = 𝑝(𝐹𝐼𝑖) = 𝛿 + 1 − 𝛿1 + exp[−?̃?(𝐹𝐼𝑖 − ?̃?)]  ,                            (17) 
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where ?̃?  (> 0) is a parameter that characterizes the slope of the function, ?̃?  is a 
parameter with regard to “difficulty” in the “economic environment,” and 𝛿 (1 ≥ 𝛿 ≥ 
0) is the probability that a consumption opportunity is accessible and also accurately 
realized by chance. The “economic environment” consists of various elements such as 
technology, political stability, legal system, diplomatic situation, natural environment, 
and restrictions on usable natural resources. “Difficulty” indicates how difficult it is for a 
household to reduce future uncertainties (i.e., to anticipate potential problems) because of 
various obstacles existing in the economy. For example, a more difficult economic 
environment means more unstable technological progress, more frequent political 
turbulence, a more unpredictable legal system, more unstable international situations, and 
more unsure restrictions on natural resources.  
 Equation (17) indicates that DFC is determined by fluid intelligence (FIi), as well 
as by difficulty in the economic environment (?̃?). FIi is an internal factor and ?̃? is an 
external factor for a household. As is evident from equation (17), if FIi is higher, Fi is 
higher, and if ?̃?  is higher, Fi is lower. Suppose that FIi, ?̃? , 𝛿,  and ?̃?  are all not 
correlated with each other, and that ?̃?, 𝛿, and ?̃? are common to all households. Hence, 
by equation (17),  
  𝑑𝐹𝑖𝑑𝐹𝐼𝑖 > 0 .                                                         (18) 
 
This inequality is the same as inequality (16). Also, by equation (17), 
 𝑑𝐹𝑖𝑑?̃? < 0 .                                                        (19) 
 
Suppose for simplicity that ?̃?, 𝛿, and ?̃? are constant. 
 
4.2.3  Approximation 
Even if households are heterogeneous, they will not be largely different from each other. 
Hence, it is highly likely that most Fi are contiguously located around a certain value 
between 0 and 1. Furthermore, because a household can realize only a small fraction of 
the huge number of consumption opportunities, most households’ F values will be close 
to 0; that is, most households’ FI will be sufficiently smaller than ?̃? in equation (17). If exp[−?̃?(𝐹𝑖 − ?̃?)]  is sufficiently large because FIi is sufficiently less than ?̃? , then 
approximately 
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 11 + exp[−?̃?(𝐹𝐼𝑖 − ?̃?)] ≅ 1exp[−?̃?(𝐹𝐼𝑖 − ?̃?)]  . 
 
Hence, approximately, there is an exponential relation between Fi and FIi such that  
  𝐹𝑖 = 𝑝(𝐹𝐼𝑖) ≅ 𝛿 + (1 − 𝛿) exp(?̃?𝐹𝐼𝑖)exp(?̃??̃?)  . 
 
Here, it is assumed for simplicity that 𝛿 = 0, and therefore 
 𝐹𝑖 = 𝑝(𝐹𝐼𝑖) ≅ exp(?̃?𝐹𝐼𝑖)exp(?̃??̃?)  .                                         (20) 
 
That is, approximately, Fi increases exponentially as FIi increases.   
 What this approximation means is that in a situation where a household can 
realize only a small fraction of consumption opportunities and therefore most households’ 
F values are close to 0, if FI increases even a little, a large number of consumption 
opportunities becomes additionally accessible and realizable. A small increase in FI 
reduces the uncertainty substantially and provides a large number of additional 
consumption opportunities (i.e., an exponential increase in consumption opportunities).  
 In addition, taking the natures of μi and πi discussed in Section 4.1 into 
consideration, equation (10) strongly implies that μi and πi are affected by FIi in the same 
manner. Hence, by equation (20), it is highly likely that   
 𝜇𝑖 ≅ 𝜆 exp(?̃?𝐹𝐼𝑖)exp(?̃??̃?)                                                   (21) 
 
and 
 𝜋𝑖 ≅ 𝜆−1 exp(?̃?𝐹𝐼𝑖)exp(?̃??̃?)  ,                                               (22) 
 
where λ is a positive constant. 
 
4.3  DFC and capital 
4.3.1  Motives for saving and investment 
Under the MDC-based procedure, a household’s CWR at MDC reflects its future plan for 
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consumption and saving, as discussed in Section 4.1.1, particularly in the sense that the 
household’s CWR indicates its feeling about whether the future is sufficiently secure 
economically. Because CWR is the ratio of labor income to capital, CWR at MDC 
indicates the extent to which a household eventually wants to accumulate capital by 
saving out of its labor income. Therefore, to examine the relation between DFC and CWR 
at MDC, we first should examine a household’s motives to save and invest money (or 
other types of economic resources). 
 First, suppose a primitive agricultural society in which currency or money has 
not yet been invented. Even in this society, people should save some economic resources. 
For example, harvested grains are not eaten only at the time of harvest but throughout the 
year, so most grains are saved at the time of harvest. That is, people put aside and stock 
some portion of their resources for future consumption. People save resources not only 
for later consumption, however, but also to increase production in the future so as to 
consume a much larger amount than the amount saved. A portion of the current resources 
that are put aside can be exchanged for tools or animals that enable production to increase 
in the future. This is the second motive for saving—resources are saved to be invested.  
 Even in our modern society, these essential motives remain the same. Savings 
and investments are made primarily because (a) people need to spread out the 
consumption of production (earnings) over time, and (b) people sacrifice some portion of 
current resources to increase production in the future, thereby increasing possible future 
consumption.   
 Savings from motive (a) are not invested and therefore no return (i.e., increases 
in future production) is expected from these resources. They do, however, depend on how 
accurately the best consumption timings in the future can be foreseen. Savings from 
motive (b) are invested and returns are expected. Production (i.e., the number of 
accessible consumption opportunities) is expected to increase by investments. Hence, the 
amount of resources that should be saved from motive (b) depends on the amount of 
expected future increases in production. 
 
4.3.2  Capital, accessibility, and accuracy 
It is assumed for simplicity that the returns from, and risks of, any investment are identical, 
finite, and common knowledge for all households (e.g., interest rates in financial markets 
are identical and commonly known to all households). Suppose also for simplicity that 
the amount of money (economic resources) that is used to realize a consumption 
opportunity is identical for any consumption opportunity; in other words, any 
consumption opportunity equally consists of a unit of consumption opportunity that has 
the same “price.”  
 
 18 
4.3.2.1  Capital, motive (b) 
A household will save and invest with motive (b) only if it estimates that some 
consumption opportunities are made additionally accessible in the future as a result of the 
investment. It will not accumulate capital infinitely, because the number of consumption 
opportunities is finite in a future period. A household will accumulate capital with motive 
(b) up to the point at which it feels that the combination of the estimated future increase 
in accessible consumption opportunities and the necessary present resulting decrease in 
consumption is most comfortable. There will be a unique combination that is felt to be 
most comfortable by each household.    
 An important point is that a household only intuitively feels whether the 
aforementioned combination is most comfortable. There is no predetermined objectively 
true and correct most comfortable combination. Nobody knows whether the combination 
with which a household subjectively feels most comfortable is equal to the predetermined 
objectively true and correct most comfortable combination. We can only say that the 
amount of capital eventually held by a household is the one that makes it subjectively feel 
most comfortable.  
 Because any consumption opportunity consists of a unit of consumption 
opportunity that has the same price as assumed above, a household’s amount of capital 
derived from motive (b) is a linear increasing function of the number of additional 
consumption opportunities that are estimated to be accessible by investments. Let ?̅?𝑖 +?̃?𝑖 be accessible consumption opportunities of household i, where ?̅?𝑖 is the accessible 
consumption opportunities that are originally accessible without the capital from motive 
(b), and ?̃?𝑖  is those that are additionally made accessible because of the capital 
(accumulated investments) of household i from motive (b) at MDC (kb,i). Because kb,i is 
a linear increasing function of ?̃?𝑖,  
  ?̃?𝑖 = 𝜒𝑘𝑏,𝑖 , 
 
where χ is a positive constant.  
 Taking this capital accumulation behavior into consideration, the consumption 
accessibility of household i indicated by equation (7) should be modified such that  
 𝜇𝑖 = ?̅?𝑖 + ?̃?𝑖𝑁 = ?̅?𝑖 + 𝜒𝑘𝑏,𝑖𝑁                                            (23) 
 
at MDC for household i. By total derivative of equation (23), 
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𝑑𝑘𝑏,𝑖𝑑𝜇𝑖 = 𝜒−1 (𝑁 − 𝑑?̅?𝑖𝑑𝜇𝑖)  .                                           (24) 
 
Here, it seems highly likely that 
𝑑?̅?𝑖𝑑𝜇𝑖 is constant because ?̅?𝑖 is irrelevant to motive (b) 
and therefore will have the same natures as equations (7) and (8). Hence, by equation (24),  
 𝑑𝑘𝑏,𝑖𝑑𝜇𝑖 = const.                                                     (25) 
 
In addition, it seems highly likely that N > 
𝑑?̅?𝑖𝑑𝜇𝑖, because N indicates the number of all 
consumption opportunities, and thereby, by equation (24) 
 𝑑𝑘𝑏,𝑖𝑑𝜇𝑖  > 0 .                          (26) 
 
Therefore, by equation (25) and inequality (26), as μi increases, the amount of capital 
from motive (b) at MDC (kb,i) increases linearly.  
 
4.3.2.2  Capital, motive (a) 
A household also sets aside some resources with motive (a). As discussed in Section 4.1.3, 
if a household feels less certain about the best timing of an accessible consumption 
opportunity, it will be less likely to set aside resources for this consumption opportunity 
and will thereby accumulate less capital with motive (a).  
 Let ?̅?𝑖 + ?̃?𝑖 be best-timing consumption opportunities of household i, where ?̅?𝑖 is the best-timing consumption opportunities that are irrelevant to capital (savings) 
with motive (a) and ?̃?𝑖 is those that are estimated to certainly match the best timings 
and make household i save money with motive (a) at MDC (ka,i). Because any 
consumption opportunity consists of a unit of consumption opportunity that has the same 
price as assumed above, a household’s capital (accumulated investments) from motive 
(a) is a linear increasing function of the number of consumption opportunities that are set 
aside with motive (a); that is, ka,i is a linear increasing function of ?̃?𝑖 such that  
 ?̃?𝑖 = 𝜉𝑘𝑎,𝑖 
 
where ζ is a positive constant.  
 Taking this capital accumulation behavior with motive (a) into consideration, the  
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consumption accessibility of household i, as indicated by equation (9), should be modified 
such that   
 𝜋𝑖 = ?̅?𝑖 + ?̃?𝑖?̅?𝑖 + ?̃?𝑖 = ?̅?𝑖 + 𝜉𝑘𝑎,𝑖?̅?𝑖 + 𝜒𝑘𝑏,𝑖                                          (27) 
 
at MDC for household i. By total derivative of equation (27), 
 𝑑𝑘𝑎,𝑖𝑑𝜋𝑖 = 𝜉−1 [?̅?𝑖 + 𝜒𝑘𝑏,𝑖 − 𝑑?̅?𝑖𝑑𝜋𝑖 − ?̅?𝑖 + 𝜉𝑘𝑎,𝑖?̅?𝑖 + 𝜒𝑘𝑏,𝑖 (𝜒 𝑑𝑘𝑏,𝑖𝑑𝜋𝑖 + 𝑑?̅?𝑖𝑑𝜋𝑖)]  .           (28) 
 
It seems highly likely that the values of 
𝑑?̅?𝑖𝑑𝜋𝑖 , ?̅?𝑖+𝜉𝑘𝑎,𝑖?̅?𝑖+𝜒𝑘𝑏,𝑖 , 𝜒 𝑑𝑘𝑏,𝑖𝑑𝜋𝑖 , and 𝑑?̅?𝑖𝑑𝜋𝑖 are all far 
smaller than that of ?̅?𝑖 + 𝜒𝑘𝑏,𝑖  because ?̅?𝑖 + 𝜒𝑘𝑏,𝑖  indicates the number of all 
accessible consumption opportunities. Therefore, by equation (28), approximately, 
 𝑑𝑘𝑎,𝑖𝑑𝜋𝑖 ≅ 𝜉−1(?̅?𝑖 + 𝜒𝑘𝑏,𝑖) .                                          (29) 
 
Here, both μi and πi will be affected by FIi in the same manner as shown in Section 4.2.3; 
therefore, ?̅?𝑖 and 𝑘𝑏,𝑖 will increase as πi increases and thereby  
  𝑑2𝑘𝑎,𝑖𝑑𝜋𝑖2 ≅ 𝜉−1 (𝑑?̅?𝑖𝑑𝜋𝑖 + 𝜒 𝑑𝑘𝑏,𝑖𝑑𝜋𝑖 ) > 0 . 
 
In addition, as with the case of 
𝑑?̅?𝑖𝑑𝜇𝑖 , it seems highly likely that 𝑑?̅?𝑖𝑑𝜋𝑖  and 𝑑𝑘𝑏,𝑖𝑑𝜋𝑖  are 
positive constants and thereby approximately 
 𝑑2𝑘𝑎,𝑖𝑑𝜋𝑖2 ≅ const.                                                    (30) 
 
Equations (29) and (30) indicate that, as πi increases, the amount of capital from motive 
(a) increases at a greater than linear rate; that is, ka,i is approximately a quadratic and 
increasing function of πi.  
 As was the case with capital from motive (b), the amount of a household’s capital 
from motive (a) is also finite, because the number of accessible consumption 
opportunities is finite in a future period and the best consumption timing of any 
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consumption opportunity arrives within a finite period. 
 
4.4  Fluid intelligence and MDC 
4.4.1  Existence of a unique CWR at MDC 
As shown in Section 4.3.2, capital from cases (a) and (b) has the common feature that it 
is finite. Hence, for a given level of labor income and, equivalently, for given levels of 
technology (A) and fluid intelligence (FIi), any household has a certain finite level of 
capital that it feels is most comfortable. That is, a unique finite value of CWR at MDC 
exists for each household.  
 
4.4.2  Fluid intelligence and capital 
As equation (25) indicates, the amount of capital from motive (b) (kb,i) is a linear 
increasing function of consumption accessibility (μi) and, as equation (21) indicates, μi is 
approximately an exponentially increasing function of FIi. Hence, the amount of capital 
from motive (b) of household i (kb,i) is approximately an exponentially increasing function 
of FIi. In addition, as equation (30) indicates, the amount of capital from motive (a) (ka,i) 
is approximately a quadratic and increasing function of consumption accuracy πi and, as 
equation (22) indicates, πi is approximately an exponentially increasing function of FIi. 
Hence, the amount of capital from motive (a) of household i (ka,i) is also approximately 
an exponentially increasing function of FIi. Therefore, the amounts of both types of 
capital are approximately exponentially increasing functions of FIi, and thereby the 
combined capitals (ka,i + kb,i) are also approximately an exponentially increasing function 
of FIi.  
 As equations (17), (20), (21), and (22) indicate, a higher FIi causes higher Fi, μi, 
and πi, and as Section 4.3.2 indicates, increases in Fi, μi, and πi cause an increase in the 
amount of capital. That is, an increase in FIi causes an increase in the amount of capital. 
The causality clearly runs from fluid intelligence to capital.  
 
4.4.3  Fluid intelligence and MDC 
Whereas capital (ki = ka,i + kb,i) amounts are approximately an exponentially accelerating 
increasing function of FIi, as shown in Section 4.4.2 and by equation (20), labor incomes 
(wi) are an exponentially decelerating increasing function of FIi, as equation (6) indicates. 
Therefore, by equations (6) and (20), the CWR at MDC of household i (the ratio of wi to 
ki at MDC; i.e., 𝛤(?̃?𝑖)) can be approximately described as 
 𝛤(?̃?𝑖) = 𝛷 exp(−𝛾?̂?) − exp(−?̂?𝐹𝐼𝑖) exp(?̃?𝐹𝐼𝑖)  ,                                (31) 
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where Φ is a positive constant. In equation (31), exp(−?̂??̂?) − exp(−𝛾𝐹𝐼𝑖) represents 
labor income (wi) and exp(?̃?𝐹𝐼𝑖) represents capital (ki).  
 By equation (31),  
 𝑑𝛤(?̃?𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝐼𝑖 = 𝛷exp[(𝛾 + ?̃?)𝐹𝐼𝑖] 〈𝛾 − ?̃?{exp[𝛾(𝐹𝐼𝑖 − ?̂?)] − 1}〉 .               (32) 
 
Because exp[−𝛾(𝐹𝐼 − ?̂?)] is far smaller than unity, as discussed in Section 2.2.3 (i.e., exp[𝛾(𝐹𝐼𝑖 − ?̂?)]  is far larger than unity) and both 𝛾  and ?̃?  are parameters that 
characterize the slopes of item response functions with regard to solving unexpected 
problems by FI for the same population and therefore will take similar values, then by 
equation (32), generally 
 𝑑𝛤(?̃?𝑖)𝑑𝐹𝐼𝑖 < 0 .                                                     (33) 
 
Inequality (33) indicates that as FI increases, the CWR at MDC decreases. The CWR at 
MDC of a household with a higher FI is lower than that of a household with a lower FI. 
 As shown in Section 2.2, a higher fluid intelligence causes higher labor income, 
and as shown in Section 4.4.2, a higher fluid intelligence also causes higher capital 
amount. Therefore, equation (31) clearly shows that the causality runs from fluid 
intelligence to CWR at MDC.  
 
4.5  Technological progress and MDC  
4.5.1  Technological progress and consumption opportunities 
As technologies progress, the number of technologically and physically feasible 
opportunities of consuming goods and services will increase because, for example, 
technological progress increases the varieties of goods and services available to 
households. However, how do consumption opportunities increase by technological 
progress? 
 Consumption opportunities will probably expand evenly or uniformly as 
technologies progress, whereas the composition structure of consumption opportunities 
remains unchanged on average because firms will keep the user interfaces with their 
products unchanged even as technologies progress. If the user interface is worse, sales of 
products and profits will decrease. Hence, if a firm recognizes that its sales and profits 
are lower because the user interface with its product is worse than expected, it will 
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improve the user interface up to the level at which the firm’s profits are maximized. 
Because the average intelligence of households will not change basically, even if 
technologies progress, the level of user interface that is required for a firm to maximize 
its profits also will not change on average, even if technologies progress. Because the 
average user interface is unchanged, the number of consumption opportunities (N) will 
increase at the same rate as production in the economy increases by technological 
progress.  
 
4.5.2  Technological progress, DFC, and difficulty 
Because fluid intelligence is highly likely given by nature, it will not change by 
technological progress. On the other hand, difficulty (?̃?) in equations (17) and (20) may 
change as technologies progress. However, because firms will keep the user interfaces 
unchanged on average, ?̃? will not be affected by technological progress. By equations 
(17) and (20), therefore, the DFC that is determined by FI and ?̃? will also not change by 
technological progress.  
 
4.5.3  Technological progress and MDC 
The accessible consumption opportunities that are originally accessible without the 
capital from motive (b) (?̅?𝑖) and the best timing consumption opportunities that are 
irrelevant to capital (savings) with motive (a) (?̅?𝑖) will increase at the same rate as N 
considering the natures of ?̅?𝑖 and ?̅?𝑖. Therefore, given a level of fluid intelligence and 
thereby values of μi and πi, the amount of capital (ki) will increase at the same rate as N, 
as equations (23) and (27) imply. Hence, because FI and ?̃?  are not affected by 
technological progress (as indicated in Section 4.5.2) and N increases at the same rate as 
production in the economy increases with technological progress (as indicated in Section 
4.5.1), the amount of capital (ki) will increase at the same rate as production in the 
economy increases with technological progress. This nature is consistent with most 
economic growth models in that, at steady state and on a balanced growth path, the entire 
capital amount in an economy increases at the same rate as production in the economy 
increases by technological progress.  
 At the same time, by equations (2) and (3), a household’s labor income (wi) 
increases at the same rate as the production in the economy increases with technological 
progress at steady state and on a balanced growth path. This nature is also consistent with 
most economic growth models. 
 Therefore, the capital (kt) and labor income (wt) of each household increase at 
the same rate as the production in the economy increases with technological progress. As 
a result, CWR at MDC does not change with technological progress; that is, 𝛤(?̃?𝑖) is 
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irrelevant to technological progress.  
 
5  SPURIOUS CORRELATION  
 
I examine the correlation between CWR at MDC (equivalently RTP) and labor income in 
Section 5.1, and then I examine the correlation between CWR and capital as well as 
capital income in Section 5.2. The case where SH (i.e., when all optimality conditions of 
all heterogeneous economies are simultaneously satisfied; Harashima, 2010, 2017a) is 
not achieved is not examined, because if SH is not achieved, then the extreme and highly 
unrealistic state where the household with the lowest CWR at MDC (i.e., the highest fluid 
intelligence) eventually monopolizes all capital will emerge as Becker (1980) and 
Harashima (2010, 2017a) indicate. 
 For this discussion, I assume for simplicity that there are many economies in a 
country, and each economy has a homogeneous population (households). In addition, 
economies are identical except for household fluid intelligence. 
 
5.1  Correlation with labor income 
The correlation with labor income is examined first in the case where economies are 
isolated from each other, and therefore SH does not matter. In this case, a higher fluid 
intelligence causes a higher productivity, as shown in Section 2.2.1, and higher labor 
income, as shown in Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3. At the same time, a higher fluid intelligence 
causes a lower CWR at MDC, as shown in Section 4.4.3. Hence, a household with a 
relatively low CWR at MDC can obtain relatively high labor incomes. As a result, CWRs 
at MDC can be observed to be negatively correlated with labor incomes among economies. 
Because CWR at MDC is substitutable with RTP, as indicated in Section 3 and by 
Harashima (2018, 2019), RTPs can also be observed to be negatively correlated with labor 
incomes. 
 An important point is that the observable correlation between CWRs at MDC (or 
RTPs) and labor incomes is spurious and does not indicate any direct causality between 
the two. Causalities exist only between fluid intelligence and other relevant elements. 
Correlations between CWRs at MDC (or RTPs) and these other elements can be observed 
only because all of them are being bridged by fluid intelligence.  
 Next, I examine the case where heterogeneous economies are fully open with 
each other except for labor force, and SH is maintained among them by appropriate 
government interventions. As noted above, a higher fluid intelligence causes a lower 
CWR at MDC and also causes higher productivity and labor income. These properties are 
unchanged even under SH, because SH affects capital accumulation, not the production 
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function. Therefore, CWRs at MDC (or RTPs) can be still observed to be negatively 
correlated with labor incomes among economies. The observable correlation between 
CWRs at MDC (or RTPs) and labor incomes under SH is still spurious and does not 
indicate any direct causality between the two. 
 
5.2  Correlation with capital and capital income 
Next, the correlations with capital and capital income are examined. In the case where 
economies are isolated from each other and SH does not matter, CWRs at MDC (or RTPs) 
can also be observed to be negatively correlated with capital and capital income by the 
same reasoning discussed in Section 5.1, and the observable correlations are still spurious. 
The case where heterogeneous economies are fully open with each other except for labor 
force, and SH is maintained among them by appropriate government interventions, is not 
as simple, however, because SH substantially and differently affects capital 
accumulations across economies.  
 Because a higher fluid intelligence causes not only lower CWRs at MDC (as 
shown in Section 4.4.3) but also higher productivity and labor incomes as well as high 
amounts of capital and capital incomes (as shown in Sections 2.2 and 4.4.2), all of these 
factors become simultaneously heterogeneous with heterogeneous fluid intelligences. 
Hence, the state where only CWRs at MDC are heterogeneous does not exist.  
 Under SH, capital accumulations of economies with relatively low CWRs at 
MDC are restrained and those with relatively high CWRs at MDC are enhanced. As a 
result, the amounts of capital that economies own do not greatly differ. Hence, CWRs at 
MDC (or RTPs) may not clearly be observed to be negatively correlated with capital and 
capital income.  
 However, in reality, SH may not be “correctly” achieved (Harashima, 2010, 
2017a). In this case, a government will intervene only up to the point at which the number 
of votes cast in elections in response to increases in the level of economic inequality is 
equivalent to that in response to decreases. If government intervention for SH is 
implemented in this manner, the amounts of capital that economies own still may differ 
substantially, even though SH appears to have been achieved. Therefore, CWR at MDC 
(or RTP) may be still clearly be observed to be negatively correlated with capital and 
capital income. An important point, however, is that even if negative correlations between 
them are observed, these correlations are still spurious and no direct causality exists.  
 
6  DISCUSSION 
 
6.1  RTP as a shadow of CWR at MDC 
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As Section 3 and Harashima (2018, 2019) indicate, RTP and CWR at MDC can be 
substituted for one another. The nature that fluid intelligence significantly influences 
CWR at MDC therefore means that it should also influence the process of RTP 
formation—or at least it can be interpreted as doing so.  
 Harashima (2004, 2014) presented a model of RTP that eliminates the serious 
drawback of Uzawa’s (1968) RTP model, which is one of the most familiar endogenous 
RTP models. The key variable in Harashima’s (2004, 2014) model is W, which indicates 
the size of the utility stream. It is defined as  
 𝑊 = lim𝑇→∞ 𝐸 ∫ 𝜌(𝑡)𝑢(𝑐𝑡)exp(−ψ𝑡)dt                                  (34)𝑇0  
 
on a balanced growth path on which yt, kt, and ct as well as technology grow at the same 
constant rate (ψ), where ct is consumption in period t, u(•) is the utility function, E is the 
expectation operator, and   
 𝜌(𝑡) = 1𝑇  if 0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑇 𝜌(𝑡) = 0    otherwise. 
 
Let c* be  
 𝐸𝑢(𝑐∗) = lim𝑡→∞ 𝐸[𝑢(𝑐𝑡)exp(−ψ𝑡)]  .                                  (35) 
 
If ψ = 0 (i.e., no economic growth), c* is a positive constant and indicates consumption at 
steady state. Even if the economy grows (i.e., ψ > 0), c* is still a positive constant because 
ct grows at rate ψ. In this sense, we can interpret c* as consumption at “steady state” not 
only when the economy does not grow but also when it is growing. By equations (34) and 
(35), 
  𝑊 = 𝐸[𝑢(𝑐∗)] . 
 
 An essential feature of this endogenous RTP model is that RTP (θ) is sensitive 
to, and a function of, W such that 
  𝜃 = ?̃?(𝑊) = ?̃?{𝐸[𝑢(𝑐∗)]}  , 
 
where the function ?̃?(∙) is monotonically continuous and continuously differentiable and  
 27 
 𝑑𝜃𝑑𝑊 = 𝑑𝜃𝑑𝐸[𝑢(𝑐∗)] < 0 .                                            (36) 
 
That is, RTP (θ) has a one-to-one correspondence with the expected utility at steady state, 𝐸[𝑢(𝑐∗)]. As equations (3) and (6) indicate, a higher FI means a larger value of 𝑊 =𝐸[𝑢(𝑐∗)], and by inequality (36), a lower RTP. The causality clearly runs from FI to RTP. 
Hence, fluid intelligence also significantly influences the formation of RTP.  
 Because 𝑊 indicates steady state consumption, a larger value means a better 
future in a sense, which means that an estimated brighter future lowers RTP. It seems 
highly likely that a higher FI causes a household to have a brighter outlook on the future, 
which in turn lowers its RTP. 
 As shown in Section 4.2, a household with a higher FI can realize a greater 
number of best-timing consumption opportunities. This also means that a higher FI 
indicates a brighter future. Because a household with a higher FI has a lower CWR at 
MDC, as shown in Section 4.4.3, a brighter future also means a lower CWR at MDC. The 
common property in determining RTP and CWR at MDC is therefore that both are 
governed by future prospects—particularly by an indicator that signals how optimistic a 
household’s view of the future is—and fluid intelligence significantly influences this 
view.    
 Note that, in the above endogenous RTP model, technological progress does not 
affect the formation of RTP because W is not affected by it, as indicated in equation (34). 
As shown in Section 4.5, technological progress also does not affect CWR at MDC.  
 Also note that the above endogenous RTP model predicts that an increase in 
uncertainty about the future economy results in an increase in RTP (Harashima, 2004, 
2014). An increase in uncertainty will correspond to an increase in difficulty (𝐷)̃ in 
equations (17) and (20). An increase in ?̃? consequently decreases F and increases CWR 
at MDC by inequalities (19), (18), and (33). Hence, CWR at MDC and RTP also have this 
common property.  
 
6.2  Indicator of a brighter future and impatience 
RTP has been regarded as indicating the degree of impatience. However, the endogenous 
RTP model shown in Section 6.1 and by Harashima (2004, 2014) indicates that 
impatience may be irrelevant to RTP. Considering the nature of RTP as a “shadow” of 
CWR at MDC, however, we can still interpret RTP as an indicator of the degree of 
impatience.  
 As shown in Section 6.1, a higher FI leads to a brighter future and a lower CWR 
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at MDC and RTP. It is highly likely that a household with a brighter future behaves less 
impatiently—in other words, it can tolerate more current displeasure. We can see this 
nature in the capital derived from motive (b). As discussed in Section 4.3.2.1, a household 
accumulates capital with motive (b) until it reaches its most comfortable combination of 
the additional future increase and the present decrease in accessible consumption 
opportunities. In this model, some resources are not consumed at present to gain future 
rewards, which means that a household must exercise patience. A larger additional future 
increase means a brighter future, but it also means a larger amount of resources that has 
to be given up at present, and a brighter future means a higher degree of patience (i.e., a 
lower degree of impatience). Hence, a lower CWR at MDC and RTP mean a lower degree 
of impatience. RTP as a shadow of CWR at MDC therefore still can be interpreted as an 
indicator of the degree of impatience. Nevertheless, the origin of impatience is not RTP 
(or CWR at MDC)—it is fluid intelligence, because a higher FI causes a lower RTP (or 
CWR at MDC). 
 Although RTP can be interpreted as an indicator of impatience, we cannot 
necessarily say that a household discounts its expected utilities with a constant RTP in 
every future period, as the RTP-based procedure indicates. Because of the nature of CWR 
at MDC, we can say that a household with a lower RTP (CWR at MDC) is less impatient 
overall, but we do not know whether its degree of impatience remains unchanged for any 
future period.  
 
6.3  “True and correct” CWR at MDC 
As discussed in 4.3.2.1, nobody knows whether the combination that a household 
subjectively feels to be most comfortable eventually is equal to the predetermined 
objectively true and correct most comfortable combination. If CWR at MDC is essentially 
determined by fluid intelligence, however, the objectively true and correct CWR at MDC 
itself may exist, because fluid intelligence is highly likely given by nature (i.e., 
exogenously). Even if the objectively true and correct value does exist, a household still 
cannot know its objectively true and correct values of FI and CWR at MDC. It can only 
make its best estimate at several economic values and behave on the basis of whether its 
CWR at MDC is most comfortable in an uncertain environment.  
 
7  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
RTP has been regarded to be negatively correlated with income, and many empirical 
studies have supported this correlation. A causality from income to RTP has generally 
been thought to exist, but the mechanism behind this causality has not been sufficiently 
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explained theoretically.  
 In this paper, I examine this problem from a different point of view, one based 
on the concept of fluid intelligence in an economy under the MDC-based procedure 
(Harashima 2019). Fluid intelligence is a type of human intelligence, and its importance 
has been emphasized in psychology and psychometrics (e.g., Cattell, 1963, 1971). 
Harashima (2019) described the MDC-based procedure through which a household 
reaches a steady state and showed that households probably use this procedure rather than 
a RTP-based procedure, because the former is far easier to use than the latter and both 
procedures lead households to the same steady state.  
 I show that a higher fluid intelligence causes a lower CWR at MDC (RTP) and 
causes higher levels of productivity, labor income, capital income, and capital. Hence, 
CWRs at MDC (RTP) can be observed to be negatively correlated with labor incomes. 
CWRs at MDC (RTPs) may not be clearly observed to be negatively correlated with 
capital and capital income at SH, because SH affects capital accumulation in different 
ways across heterogeneous households. However, if a government intervenes up to the 
point at which the numbers of votes cast in elections in response to increases and 
decreases in the level of economic inequality are balanced, SH may not be achieved 
correctly. Therefore, negative correlations between the above factors may be still clearly 
observed. 
 In any case, however, the observed negative correlations are spurious and there 
is no direct causality between them. They appear to be correlated only because they are 
bridged by fluid intelligence.  
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